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CREATIVITY OR IMITATION: 
JAPANESE SUCCESS IN 
VCR TECHNOLOGY 
Jeanine M. Kasulis 
Introduction 
Until the late 1960s, U.S. industry enjoyed 
a preeminent position in technology and com-
manded a significant market share in the field 
for industrial and commercial products. Dur-
ing the decades that have followed, however, 
competitive strides by the Japanese have made 
stunning impacts on world and domestic mar-
kets alike. Superior Japanese performance has 
been a growing concern in a wide array of 
industrial and commercial fields, including 
home electronics, office automation, semicon-
ductors, robotics, and biotechnology. Once a 
war-tom, poverty-stricken country, Japan has 
taken great leaps towards supplanting the po-
sitions of other industrialized nations, such as 
America, as an innovative leader and replacing 
Western products with its own technological 
feats. 
The consumer electronics field is a vivid 
example of an area formerly dominated by 
American ingenuity and subsequently taken 
over by cleverly produced, high quality, low 
priced Japanese goods. The videocassette re-
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corder (VCR), a popular electronics device found 
in two out of five American homes, was origin-
ally invented as a broadcasting tool by a Cali-
fornia-based American firm named Ampex in 
1956 (Television and Video Almanac, 1988, p. 
433). The invention evolved over the next two 
decades into a product that could be used in 
the home; but Ampex in particular, and the 
American electronics industry in general, fell 
out of competition. Today, the superiority of 
the Japanese in the home VCR field is so over-
whelming that no American manufacturer even 
bothers trying to make such a product; instead, 
all the major American electronics companies-
RCA, Zenith, General Electric, and the rest-
buy Japanese-made VCRs and add their name-
plates to them (Verespej, 1986, p. 29). Today 
Japan is the foremost producer and exporter of 
VCRs with 90 percentoftheworld's production 
(Abegglen and Stalk, 1985). 
Much speculation has been made about 
Japan's astounding success in segments of the 
U.S. home market. Such speculation includes 
the persistent myth that while Americans are 
naturally inventive and creative, the Japanese 
are merely clever copiers and adapters of im-
ported foreign technology. Mter all, it is claimed, 
the importation of advanced technological 
processes is one of the leading factors in Japan's 
economic growth since World War II (Shishido, 
1985). Therefore, according to this view, the 
Japanese have succeeded by shamelessly bor-
rowing technological innovations from the U.S. 
and other nations and transforming them into 
inexpensive household staples. 
However, if there was ever a time to label 
the Japanese as mere imitators, that time has 
certainly passed. Not only have the Japanese 
established a solid record of creativity and in-
novation, but there is growing evidence that 
Americans may be losing some of their knack 
for developing products (Rudolph, 1988). Along 
with their appropriation of basic imported tech-
nologies, the Japanese have also shown a grow-
ing talent for improving and enhancing 
consumer goods by translating them into rea-
sonably-priced, useful products. The Japanese 
also appear to intuitively understand the needs 
and desires of the consumer market. 
The home VCR market provides an excel-
lent case study of Japanese appropriation and 
improvement of American-invented goods. This 
innovation, discovered by an American firm 
which enjoyed years of patent protection that 
should have given it a dominant competitive 
advantage in the field, has been handed over to 
Japanese companies. The reason for Japan's 
successful appropriation of VCR technology is 
not to be found in clever imitation. Rather, the 
Japanese success can be attributed to such fac-
tors as superiority in the manufacture of solid 
state devices, foresight in the consumer field, 
and a broadminded approach to the VCR target 
markets. The intent..of this paper, therefore, is 
to examine the marketing and technological 
development of the VCR in the U.S. and its ap-
propriation and dramatic improvement by the 
Japanese. I will begin the analysis by tracing 
the initial development of the VCR and the 
technological difficulties that were encount-
ered by firms determined to produce a success-
ful prototype. I will then point out the factors 
that led the Japanese to dominate VCR produc-
tion and the American firms to falter. Finally, I 
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will discuss what implications these factors 
have with regard to the issue of Japanese crea-
tivity and technological ability. 
The Emergence. of the VCR Concept 
On September 27, 1951, David Sarnoff, 
President of RCA Laboratories, celebrated the 
45th anniversary of his start in the radio busi-
ness. A gala ceremony was held in RCA Labor-
atories in Princeton, New Jersey. During the 
ceremony Mr. Sarnoff gave a speech concern-
ing how to prepare for his 50th anniversary, 
just five years away. 
Sarnoff, who was celebrated for his powers 
of prognostication as far back as 1916 when he 
envisioned the presence of "radio music boxes" 
in ordinary homes, suggested three presents 
that he would be pleased to receive at his 50th 
anniversary: a true amplifier of light, an all-
electronic air conditioner, and a television pic-
ture recorder that would record the video sig-
nals of television on an inexpensive tape 
(Lardner, p. 55). The third request was one 
which was well-understood by the engineers at 
RCA The firm was associated with broadcast-
ing networks through its NBC subsidiary, and 
the only way to record a television program 
back in 1951-the days of live TV-was by 
kinescope recording, a process that amounted 
to putting a movie camera in front of the TV 
screen. Not only was this process costly, but it 
also produced a less-than-desirable picture 
quality and was a time-consuming process as 
well. Time was a factor of particular concern to 
the broadcast field back then since networks 
often faced the task of taking a live transmis-
sion of a program airing at one time in the East 
and preparing a recorded version for broadcast 
three hours later . in the West. A video tape 
recorder would provide a quicker, cheaper al- ~ 
ternative to TV broadcasters. 
Although there exists no barrier in princi-
ple to recording a television signal, the task 
provides a great deal more complexity than 
recording an audio signal. A TV image is an 
intricate and complicated one that must be 
changed 30 times a second to simulate motion. 
Therefore a TV signal must transmit millions of 
instructions to the picture tube every second. 
The main difficulty associated with recording a 
high definition signal lies in the frequency 
involved, which extends to six megahertz (six 
million cycles a minute), and the range of fre-
quencies, which covers about 20 octaves. 
The mechanics of recording and playback 
for audio involves the recording tape, record-
ing head, microphone, and speaker. The re-
cording tape used is generally made of a plastic 
base and contains a binder, or coating, that 
holds magnetic powder used to record a signal 
to the base. This tape is pulled past a recording 
head which produces fluctuations of intensity 
and polarity in direct response to the electrical 
input of a microphone, leaving a trail of magne-
tism on the tape. During playback the roles are 
reversed with the magnetized particles on the 
tape dictating to the head, which in tum relays 
fluctuations in magnetism to an amplifier and 
then to a speaker. Similarly, in television re-
cording the electronic camera changes the var-
iations in light, which compose a picture, into 
a long train of electrical impulses. The impulses · 
representing dark and light parts of the picture 
act on videotape as the impulses representing 
changes in amplitude act on audiotape. Al-
though this is a relatively straightforward proc-
ess, the intricacies of the TV signal call for 
higher frequencies to transmit the signal. 
The solution that first occurred to engi-
neers working on a video recording process was 
to use a modified audiotape recorder and sim-
ply speed up the recording process. Just as a 
tape recorder is set at a higher speed for music 
than for speech, the recorder would have to be 
set at a still higher speed for TV. This idea set 
engineers at RCA to work in 1951 on increasing 
the speed of a basic modified audiotape record-
er and resulted in a prototype in which the tape 
hurtled past the recording head at a speed of 
thirty feet per second (20 miles an hour)- so 
fast that the engineers charged with stopping 
and rewinding the machine had to wear heavy 
leather gloves (Lardner, p. 57). This prototype 
took over a mile of tape to hold a four-minute 
long recording and had a picture suffering from 
poor resolution, flicker, diagonal disturbance, 
and occasional ghosts. 
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Invention of the VCR 
As RCA engineers attempted to increase 
tape speed, engineers at Ampex Corporation in 
Redwood City, California, followed a different 
research route. Charles Ginsberg, who was in 
charge of Ampex's videotape recorder project, 
had committed himself to an idea conceived by 
Marvin Camras. Camras had envisioned a ma-
chine in which the head, as well as the tape, 
was a moving part-and was in fact the faster 
moving of the two. Ray Dolby (later of "Dolby 
sound" fame) further developed the notion by 
implementing a system using four heads along 
with a two-way switching system that sim-
plified circuitry and corrected timing sequenc-
ing. These heads were placed along the side of a 
rotating drum and made single lines of magne-
tism on the tape- a process called "transverse 
scanning." Such a process economized on the 
use of tape and was capable of recording much 
higher frequencies than those achieved in the 
original recording machines. Since the prob-
lem with RCA's prototype involved head-to-
tape speed (the speed at which the tape passed 
the heads) and maintenance of a low reel-to-
reel speed (to reduce the total length of tape 
required), Ampex's idea of moving the tape 
heads was an ingenious one (Robinson, 1974). 
In addition to the idea of using moving 
heads, Ampex was working on the concept of 
using FM (frequency modulation) as opposed 
to AM (amplitude modulation) recording, since 
AM is well-known for its sensitivity to inter-
ference. FM had never been used before in con-
junction with magnetic tape because its signal 
took up a great deal of space. With a four-minute 
recording already requiring one mile of tape, 
engineers shied away from complicating the 
problem by adding FM recording. However, 
Charles Anderson, an Ampex engineer familiar 
with the field of FM broadcasting, reasoned 
that it was the rate of change in the frequency 
and not the frequency itself that coveyed pic-
ture information and argued that the use of FM 
recording would suffice. 
In February of 1956 Ampex produced a 
prototype that showed a promising picture. 
With the aid of transverse scanning and FM 
recording, the Ampex machine had the tape 
moving at the pace of 15 inches a second and 
had the capability to record a ninety-minute 
program on a fourteen-and-one-half inch reel 
as opposed to a four-minute program on a 
seventeen-inch reel in the RCA prototype. 
Although Ampex gained a significant ad-
vantage as the first company to discover a via-
ble recording process among the many firms 
competing to do so, Ampex had only the dim-
mest notion of what it had accomplished. In its 
potential demand forecast for the product, 
managers at Ampex concluded that an expec-
tation of approximately 30 machines in four 
years would be reasonable. Mter all, as Joseph 
Roizen, an Ampex development engineer and 
product manager, reasoned, "It was just going 
to be used for time delay, and how many people 
needed to do that?" (Lardner, p. 59). Never did 
Ampex anticipate the phenomenal effect that 
video recording capabilities would have either 
on the broadcast market, ending the age of live 
TV, or on the consumer market, as a popular 
time-saving mechanism. 
To say that Ampex's forecasts were conser-
vative would be an understatement. Within 
four days after its product demonstration, 
Ampex had contracted to sell some 80 machines 
at fifty thousand dollars each. 
The Japanese Takeover 
Ampex's discovery in 1956 was a unique 
one; for it not only established the best method 
available at that time for recording a TV signal, 
but in developing this method used very clear-
cut and well-defined technologies-namely, 
transverse scanning and FM recording. This 
allowed Ampex to secure strong, clearly-defined 
patents-a factor which led RCA and many 
other American firms to scrap their own efforts 
and designs and to try to effect an arrangement 
with Ampex instead. The lack of competitive 
threats by other American firms and the over-
whelming thrill of discovery left Ampex with a 
·false sense of security, and led the firm to believe 
that its discovery would mean the control of 
the VCR business at home and abroad for years 
to come. 
However, as Ampex sat back and reaped 
the benefits of its discovery, Japanese firms 
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such as Sony, Toshiba, Matsushita, and NC 
continued to toy with the VCR technology, as 
they had been doing since 1953. The Japanese 
firms did not shy away from producing a VCR 
because of Ampex's patents; rather the very 
idea that Ampex had proved that television 
recording could be done attracted them to the 
market. The Japanese government industrial 
planning agency, MITI, played an important 
role in stimulating Japanese corporate interest 
in the VCR. When NHK and other Japanese 
broadcasters applied to the government for 
permission to buy Ampex VCRs at a cost of 
more than eighty thousand dollars each, the 
thought of so much money flowing overseas 
provoked MITI to make a pool of money avail-
able for a crash effort to produce a domestic 
altemativ_e. MITI's answer was to prompt Japa-
nese firms to develop a way to produce VCRs 
that would be independent of Ampex's patented 
technology. 
As a result of their research, the Japanese 
companies developed a new technology in 
which the recording head produced a magnetic 
trail that ran diagonally across the tape. This 
new technology was developed in the research 
laboratories of Toshiba Massuda, one of Japan's 
largest electrical equipment and electronics 
firms, by Dr. Norikazu Sawazaki. The new proc-
ess involved only one revolving head and was 
capable of continuously recording the whole 
TV picture field on a slant track (Sawazaki; 
1960). The process made each "swipe" across 
the tape longer than in transverse scanning, 
which in tum reduced the number of times the 
signal had to switch from one head to the other 
head and allowed for simpler circuitry. Because 
the path of the tape resembled a helix, or coil, 
the technology became known as "helical scan-
ning." Unfortunately, the systems developed in 
Japan still depended largely on the FM record-
ing method patented by Ampex, and this pro-
vided an insurmountable barrier to any Japanese 
firm with hopes of an early entrance into the 
field. 
Adopting New Technology 
Japan's breakthrough into the field came 
when Ampex made the decision to transis-
torize its recorders to make them smaller and 
less expensive. At the time (1960), Ampex en-
gineers were accustomed to using vacuum 
tubes rather than solid state devices. Therefore, 
they were at a decided disadvantage due to 
their lack of expertise in this field. To compen-
sate, Phil Gundy, vice president of marketing, 
solicited the help of a Japanese firm- Sony-
whose transistorized devices had impressed 
him during his travels in Japan. Gundy pro-
ceeded to make a proposal to Sony that would 
involve Sony in the design and supply of tran-
sistorized circuits for use in a "portable" ver-
sion of the Ampex VCR; in return, Sony would 
receive the right to make VCRs for non-broad-
cast customers. In 1960 a letter of agreement 
was signed, and Sony started on its path towards 
domination of the VCR consumer market. 
The ready adaption of new technology by 
the Japanese soon gave them a strong advan-
tage over American firms and opened the doors 
to production of the VCR- a product they 
helped make more affordable and portable 
through the use of transistors. Developing the 
transistor radio and, years before, the tape re-
corder had been formative experiences for Sony. 
Sony had had its start in a leaking, war-tom 
factory where its engineers worked with um-
brellas overtheirdesks to keep out rain and the 
other elements. Its first two products, a rice 
cooker and a heated cushion, had failed com-
mercially and had led the company to the pro-
duction of tape recorders. In 1948 no plastic 
(which was used as recording tape) could be 
found in war-tom Japan, and Sony first mar-
keted a tape recorder using plain paper and 
magnetic powder as its tape. 
With the later development of the transis-
tor, Sony not only established a technological 
superiority in the field of solid state devices, 
but it also established a pattern which it would 
follow in later years: "the determination to do 
something other companies had not done; the 
struggle to improve the yield; and the maniacal 
embrace of a goal" (Lardner, p. 51). The Japa-
nese learned to embrace rather than resist tech-
nology and visualized the adoption of new 
techniques and the eradication of old methods 
as a competitive weapon rather than a threat. 
Hard work and insight are important ingredi-
ents in turning sophisticated technology into 
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·simple consumer goods. This philosophy is one 
which is sometimes overlooked by many Amer-
icans who seem so often overwhelmed by the 
"impossibility" which they assign to tasks. 
Masaru Ibuka, founder of Sony, often tells the 
story of his visit to Western Electric to learn 
about transistor technology: 
They asked me, "What do you intend 
to use transistors for?" When I an-
swered, "I am considering using them 
for radios," they kindly advised me, 
"Don't waste your time and money" (lbuka, 1975, p. 16). 
It was also Sony which, when the large American 
companies decided against putting compact 
discs (CDs) in production because of the huge 
capital outlay required, was the first to go into 
CD production along with Philips of Holland. 
American firms, like Ampex, had a more 
hesitant attitude towards the adoption of new 
technology- a factor that hurt Ampex in the 
final reckoning. It was not until 1960, four 
years after the first Ampex VCR demonstration-
a long time in the ever-changing electronics 
field- that the vice president of marketing, 
Phil Gundy, realized that Ampex had better 
transistorize its recorders to make them cheaper 
and more reliable. However, Ampex's deficiency 
in the area of solid state devices was a hin-
drance to the firm. Ampex product manager, 
Joseph Roizen, related during an interview: 
We knew how to design circuits with 
vacuum tubes backwards. We didn't 
understand solid state devices. Most 
of the guys were in their late 'twenties 
or 'thirties, and all of a sudden every-
thing they learned in college was ob-
solete, and young guys were coming 
out of college with this transistor tech-
nology. So nobody at Ampex was very 
enthusiastic. In fact, there were some 
engineers with little signs on their 
desks that said, "Help stamp out tran-
sistors!" (Lardner, p. 63). 
Resistance to the introduction of new 
technology is, in fact, a long tradition in the 
West, symbolized by the Luddite movement 
against textile machines in early nineteenth 
century Britain. Labor relations problems in-
tensify this technological resistance, for in · 
Western companies new technology is often 
viewed as a threat to employment and income 
levels. On the other hand, the Japanese welcome 
new technology in terms of the potential it 
creates for increased profits and for the addi-
tional job security provided by the improved 
performance of the companies for which they 
work. 
Strategic Planning 
When engineers at Ampex and in Japan 
combined the technologies of helical scanning 
with transistorization in 1960, they paved a 
clear path for the development of the VCR for 
the mass market. It then became the duty of 
each firm involved in VCR development to es-
tablish a lucrative market and to develop a 
long-term commitment to cultivating its chosen 
markets. While engineers at RCA (who worked 
under cross-licenses with Ampex) and Ampex 
saw the potential for developing the technol-
ogy, the top managers in both firms decided to 
focus their video efforts on the broadcast market 
-a decidedly limited field. The opportunity 
inherent in the new design synthesis was most 
clearly perceived by the Japanese firms- Sony, 
NC, and Matsushita. It is these three com-
panies that have dominated the home video 
market since 1957. 
Mter the failure of RCA to be the first to 
develop a videotape recorder, it scrapped its 
VCR designs and worked under cross-licensing 
with Ampex. However, RCA's attention to the 
VCR field was sporadic; senior corporate execu-
tives were instead preoccupied with challenges 
by Zenith and other firms in the area of televi-
sion receiver manufacture. At the same time, 
electronic computers were becoming a big in-
dustry and caught RCA by surprise. Conse-
quently, RCA's management terminated work 
on applications of videorecording in 1958. It 
was not until the early 1970s that RCA again 
attempted, abortively, to innovate VCR design 
with its SelectaVision, a product which became 
a commercial failure (Cusumano and 
Rosenbloom, 1987, p. 55). RCA's decision to 
market videodiscs with SelectaVision not only 
turned out to be a $1 billion dollar mistake-
including R&D costs, operating losses, and the 
eventual writeoff- but forfeited any chance for 
RCA to cash in on manufacturing profits from 
the VCR boom (Verespej, 1986, p. 32). As it 
6 
turned out, RCA made several mistakes by un-
derestimating its competitors. For example, it 
chose to develop videodisc technology rather 
than VCR technology because it believed that 
the machinery needed to mass produce pick-up 
heads on tape could not be improved. It also 
underestimated the ability of its competitors to 
cope with these manufacturing difficulties. The 
same problem was faced by the Japanese, but 
they solved it in the laboratories of Sony and 
Matsushita (Business Week, 1984, p.89). Simi-
larly, RCA did not think VCR prices could come 
down significantly because it underestimated 
the ability of Japanese firms to cut manufactur-
ing costs. Finally, RCA did not anticipate that 
the market for rented movie tapes would be 
very large, driving down software costs for VCRs 
to levels far below costs of the videodisc. 
At Ampex, after the first successful VfR 
(videotape· recorder) design was developed, a 
transistorized VCR was marketed for closed-
circuit use in 1962. Ampex ignored the com-
petitive efforts of Japanese firms in the field 
since Ampex then accounted for 80 percent of 
all television recorders in use throughout the 
world and felt well-positioned to extend its 
dominant share into the consumer market 
(Business Week, 1967, p. 167). Ampex felt no 
threat in 1962 when Sony demonstrated the 
first fully-transistorized VCR with a two-head 
helical scan system, for it thought the Sony 
design would never succeed commercially 
(Lyons, 1976, p. 203). However, Sony's design 
was successful. Later, when Sony Corporation 
Vice President Shigemi Nakaro claimed in 1970 
that Sony would soon be marketing a video sys-
tem at $350 per player, a price much lower than 
that of Ampex's model, managers of American 
companies (including Ampex) charged Sony 
with making idle claims (Forbes, 1970, p. 13). 
So rather than responding to foreign threats, 
Ampex made an effort to reduce dependence on 
VfR revenues, and top priority was given to 
assuring continued dominance in the studio 
equipment market rather than the video broad-
casting field. 
Leadership provided by general managers 
is essential to a corporation's achieving consis-
tent direction over a lengthy period of develop-
ment. In America, top management direction 
has all too often been lacking or inconsistent 
over time. Clarity of the commitment by Japa-
nese firms to pursue the potential consumer 
market, however, shaped critical choices among 
uncertain technical alternatives. Because of 
this commitment the Japanese did not pursue 
random "breakthrough" technology as did some 
of their American counterparts. Sony, in par-
ticular, rapidly became the leader in the develop-
ment of VCR technology for the mass market, 
for Sony had always thought of the VCR as a 
·potential consumer product. It was not only a 
simple time-saving device for people "on the 
go" but represented "defiance against [pro--
gramming] tyranny." In other words, Sony 
thought that the customer should be able to 
watch what he'd like to, when he'd like to. 
Sony's efforts in the manufacture of the VCR 
were consistent with its strategic planning: to 
attract the consumer market the VCR had to be 
made as reliable as possible, compact in size, 
and less expensive. Thus, in contrast to the on-
again, off-again efforts in VCR development by 
the Americans, the Japanese's progress was 
steady and incremental. 
Marketing The VCR 
As Sony strived to seek the "ultimate" 
machine for the consumer market, technologi-
cal improvements continued. Iron oxide gave 
way to a finer, more sensitive magnetic powder 
on the tape. Micromanufacturing processes 
allowed for a smaller recording head. A new 
tape loading system called U-loading also was 
developed. 
In 1969, all these advances helped pro-
duce the Sony U-matic, which was the first 
videocasette recorder to reach the mass market. 
However, before the U-matic was formally in-
troduced, Sony took an unprecedented step. 
Sony realized that success depended largely on 
familiarizing the consumer with the VCR and 
emphasizing its easy use so as not to "intimidate" 
those who were technologically unsophis-
ticated. But at this time, other Japanese com-
panies were also working hard at different VCR 
models. Sony feared that if all companies were 
to come up with incompatible formats, the 
consumer would recoil in confusion. Therefore, 
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it decided to show its machine to two of its 
Japanese competitors- Matsushita and NC-
in the hope that they would adopt it as a com-
mon standard for the market. Both competitors 
studied the machine, made recommendations 
for improvement or change, and eventually 
agreed to adopt the format. The Oriental wis-
dom involved in consolidating the marketplace 
by standardizing the equipment to make it 
interchangeable meant that the in-fighting 
among manufacturers would not result in con-
fusion about what they were selling. This is a 
lesson which American manufacturers have yet 
to learn: winner-take-all fights have left the 
consumer with much outdated equipment over 
the years. On the other hand, the Japanese have 
learned that aggressive coexistence can make 
everybody better off (Robinson, 1974, p. 259). 
Collaborative efforts among the Japanese have 
resulted in many other technological improve-
ments, including the development of azimuth 
recording, color advances in tape making, inte-
grated circuits, and servo-mechanisms. Sony's 
next generation of video machines was the 
product of long, collaborative efforts guided by 
patience until each specification was met. 
Efforts by Matsushita and NC to cultivate 
the consumer field have also been substantial. 
Matsushita, known for its lines under such 
names as Panasonic, Quasar, and Technics, has 
a company stategy of making product innova-
tions cheaper and more affordable for the home 
market. NC made its impact on the market by 
producing the VHS, or video home system, in 
response to the consumer's need for a longer 
recording time on the tape than the one hour 
provided by Sony's Betamax. Consumer re-
sponse to the longer playing time was extremely 
favorable. Within a few years after the VHS 
introduction, it had become the standard for 
over 80 percent of all VCR installations world-
wide, outselling Betamax by three to one 
(Much, 1984, p. 51). 
Ampex, in the meantime, had concen-
trated its efforts solely on the broadcast field-
a strategy which led to problems. As a profes-
sional company used to dealing with highly 
knowledgeable buyers, Ampex was unaccus-
tomed to marketing a product to a technologi-
cally unsophisticated consumer base. When 
Ampex tried to target the education market, it 
found a market unfamiliar with the new video-
tape technology. In addition, in the business-
to-business sales market, product specifications 
are often tailored to an account's specific needs. 
As a result, in the professional broadcast field, 
Ampex had often dealt with customers who 
were not afraid to voice their ideas on what 
features should be changed or added to exist-
ing systems they were buying. Consequently, 
the addition of extra features and mod-
ifications was making Ampex's VCR price rise, 
rather than fall, thelongeritwason the market-
which put it at a competitive disadvantage. 
Furthermore, although Ampex's machines had 
the extra features, their quality suffered from 
poor manufacturing. For example, Ampex's 
VCRs were heavier than the Japanese models 
and their tape guide system was erratic, so that 
programs recorded on one machine couldn't 
necessarily be played back on another. What is 
more, the Ampex machines developed a reputa-
tion for breaking down often (Lardner, p. 70). In 
the end, although the Sony VCRs didn't have 
all the "bells and whistles" offered on the Ampex 
machines, consumers felt the Sony machines 
were more reliable and convenient. 
Learning By Trying 
Whereas many American firms tend to re-
spond to demand forces through a strategy 
based on forecasts and demand analysis, Japa-
nese firms set out a clear strategy of creating 
demand. This practice stems partially from a 
Japanese mistrust of market research. Before 
the Sony Walkman emerged on the scene, mar-
ket research had shown that consumers would 
not be interested in buying a tape cassette 
player that could not record (Johansson and 
Nonaka, 1987, p. 16). The stunning success of 
the Walkman has since shown this research to 
be mistaken. As Akio Morita, one of Sony's 
founders, proclaimed in a 1980 interview, "You 
can't research a market for a product that 
doesn't exist" (Cusumano and Rosenbloom, 
1987, p. 56). This mistrust of marketing research 
has led Japanese firms to apply "high technol-
ogy" to the consumer market by developing 
innovative products based on ambitious but 
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specific markets and the conviction as to what 
will sell, rather than what existing markets 
already demand. As a result, Japanese firms are 
less likely to suffer from "marketing myopia" or 
to become late market entries, because the 
focus of their efforts is on creating demand, 
rather than responding to it. 
The Japanese also have a system of "learn-
ing by trying." Whereas American firms worry 
about marketing the "perfect" product and 
focus too much on product features rather than 
product reliability, Japanese firms focus on 
quality manufacturing and add features sug-
gested by market feedback. The Japanese firms 
flooded the market with a series ofVCRs, learn-
ing from each error or success. At Sony the first 
machine developed was the SV-100, which · 
turned out to be too large and costly for its cus-
tomers. Next, Sony developed a series of smaller 
and I_ess expensive models: first, the PV-100, a 
transistorized, helical scanning machine; next 
the EV (educational video) series that used 
one-inch-wide rather than two-inch-wide tape; 
and finally in 1965 the CV-2000, celebrated as 
the world's first "home videocorder." 
Conclusion 
Professor Harvey Brooks of Harvard Uni-
versity has offered an interesting perspective 
on Japanese creativity: 
Although Japanese success in recent 
years has been based on adaptation of 
Western, mainly American, technol-
ogy, and on the capacity to commer-
cialize it more rapidly than its com-
petitors, it would be wrong to 
conclude from this that the Japanese 
are mere imitators who, once they 
have attained to the world state-of-
the-art in a field, will not continue to 
move forward the frontiers of technol-
ogy. On the contrary, successful imi-
tation, far from being symptomatic of 
lack of originality as used to be 
thought, is the first step of learning to 
be creative. It may be only those who 
try continually to reinvent the wheel 
that will lose out in the innovative 
race (Brooks, 1983, p.17). 
In other words, the process of creation tends to 
include a large element of"copying." The auto-
mobile was not called a horseless carriage for 
nothing. The automobile incorporates some 
basic principles of the horseless carriage; yet 
no one would classify or denigrate the inven-
tors of the automobile as" copiers." In the same 
manner the current VCR has as much in com-
mon with the VCR created in the '50s as a 747 
jet has with Wilbur and Orville Wright's air-
plane. Both share a common purpose, enter-
tainment or transportation, but both are foreign 
to their ancestors in terms of appearance and 
technological sophistication. 
The time to berate the Japanese as mere 
copiers may have existed in the past. But any 
current speculation that the Japanese will be 
unable to hold on to their competitive edge in 
the field of manufacture is misguided and un-
founded. The day of determining which coun-
try holds the decided superiority in the manu-
facture of consumer goods looms on the horizon. 
New innovations such as ACTV (an interactive 
television system), high resolution television, 
freeze frame options, and digital transmission 
are just a few of the new concepts currently 
being refined and developed. One thing remains 
clear. The Japanese have managed to do quite 
well for themselves in closing the supposed 
"creativity gap," and the United States will no 
longer be able to take refuge in its claim of crea-
tive superiority. In the decades to come, the 
United States will have to muster every ounce 
of its entrepreneurial spirit, risk-taking ability, 
and technological know-how in order to remain 
competitive- because the Japanese are just 
getting started. 
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